In the midst of crisis and defeat at the end of 1918, the civilian leaders of Germany were demoralized and confused. Germany's military defeat had brought about the collapse of the Imperial government, the proclamation of a republic virtually by accident, and the establishment of a government whose authority was not recognized even on the streets of Berlin. On the surface, the army appeared to be in the same state. The rear units had taken part in the overthrow of the monarchy, and the field armies were being brought home and demobilized. Behind the scenes, however, the high command and the General Staff were not as confused and uncertain as civilian leaders. Even before the civil war ended in Berlin and Munich, the General Staff had absorbed the lessons of World War I and begun rebuilding the army. From its frank assessment of its strengths and weaknesses in the war, the army was able to remold its organization and tactical doctrine. By any normal application of the principles of economics, international politics, and military history, the German Empire never stood a chance of winning World War I. It was a case of Germany against the world: Germany, bolstered by three weak allies—Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria—was pitted against France, Russia, the British Empire, the United States, Italy, and several other nations. Despite the odds, Germany nearly won the war on the battlefield. As late as June 1918 the German Army was on the offensive, pushing back the Allied armies in France. The Germans had fought so well and been victorious so often that when the collapse came only five months later, some generals—most notably Erich von Lu-dendorff—refused to acknowledge that the Imperial Army had been defeated on the battlefield, blaming the collapse instead on a "stab in the back" by traitorous politicians and civilians on the home front.
Most generals and experienced officers did not share Ludendorff's view. They knew that the Imperial Army had been defeated militarily, but even this awareness did.not replace the conviction that Germany could— should—have won the war. Since a defeated army has more incentive to study the lessons of the war, many German officers began to write histories, memoirs, studies, and articles filled with criticism and support of wartime leadership, tactics, and strategy. General Staff training had traditionally emphasized the study of military history, and the smoke had barely cleared before officers were interpreting the war's lessons. Thus by the end of World War I, a consensus on the strategic, tactical, and technological lessons of the army's experience could be found within the General Staff Corps. These conclusions would be reinforced by further study, debate and reflection.
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