Lendle

On January 28, 1986, the NASA Space Shuttle Challenger burst into a ball of flame 73 seconds after take-off, leading to the death of all seven people on board. Conventional explanations for the disaster cite a failure in communication—lower level engineers failed to inform managers adequately about the seriousness of problems with the O-ring seals—or unscrupulous managers risked the safety of the flight crew in order to meet launch schedules and maintain government funding. Drawing on meticulous research of scholars who studied the actual work of the engineers involved in Challenger, the author shows that the conventional explanations are not supported by the historical record. The technology was new, complex, and hazardous. Decision makers were competent and honest. They were well aware of problems with the seals, but they judged the risk to be acceptable. In retrospect we know that they were mistaken, but understanding the severity of the problem at the time was not at all the simple matter that later critics made it out to be
This book is intended for three audiences: 1) students in engineering ethics classes, 2) practicing engineers concerned about professional ethics issues, and 3) laypersons interested in gaining a more accurate picture of one of the most publicized and misunderstood technological disasters of the twentieth century.
Instructors considering using this book in their classes should note that students can read the book, once purchased, by using the free Amazon program, Kindle for PC, which runs on any PC.